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EUDAIMONISM, TELEOLOGY,
AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS:
MEISTER ECKHART ON “LIVING WITHOUT A WHY”
John M. Connolly

Recent interest among both philosophers and the wider public in the tradition
of virtue ethics often takes its inspiration from Aristotle or from Thomas Aquinas. In this essay I briefly outline the ethical approaches of these two towering
figures, and then describe more fully the virtue ethics of Meister Eckhart, a
medieval thinker who admired, though critically, both Aristotle and Aquinas.
His related but distinctively original approach to the virtuous life is marked
by a striking and seemingly paradoxical injunction to “live without why.”

The virtue ethics1 of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas are related, Aquinas having incorporated into his moral theology substantial elements of
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Their roles in the lively contemporary revival of virtue-ethics show that both of these ethical systems continue to
inspire philosophers, and to exercise, in Thomas’s case, truly substantial
influence beyond the academy, since much Catholic moral teaching and
preaching derives from his writings. Obviously, many continue to feel the
attraction of the idea that at the heart of ethics is a deep connection between the quality of the life we lead, as measured by our virtues and vices,
and the fulfillment or happiness which each of us can attain.
But nowhere do Aristotle and Thomas—not to mention Meister Eckhart
—differ more strikingly than over the nature of this fulfillment. Aristotle’s eudaimonism is the view that our happiness or perfection, that is,
the objectively most desirable form of life, consists in the active practice
of the moral and (especially) intellectual virtues.2 While large stretches of
I am grateful for helpful comments from Ernie Alleva, Lynne Baker, Charles Donahue,
Jay Garfield, Murray Kiteley, Gareth Matthews, Bernard McGinn, Janice Moulton,
and Malcolm Smith, as well as audience members at the Fall 2003 meeting of the
Northern New England Philosophical Association and the 39th International Congress on Medieval Studies, where versions of this paper were presented. I am particularly indebted to Harold Skulsky and to Tobias Hoffmann for careful criticisms of
early drafts, to Theo Kobusch, and to two anonymous reviewers for this journal.
1
Virtue-ethics has been one of the most active fields in moral philosophy in
recent decades, while William Bennett’s The Book of Virtues (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1996) was a number-one best seller in the U.S. during the 1990s.
2
More fully: the active practice of those virtues in a life not unduly beset with
maladies, catastrophes, hunger, and the like. In insisting on a modicum of amenities
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Thomas’s writings on ethics (e.g., his analysis of human action) are plainly
Aristotelian, non-Aristotelian elements dominate at many points, e.g.,
where core Christian notions (grace, salvation, charity, etc.) go beyond
Aristotle’s pagan this-worldliness.3 The result, I will suggest, is a hybrid
that on crucial points concerning the nature of both the virtues and happiness is thoroughly un-Aristotelian. That two thinkers from such different
cultures should diverge on the content of happiness is not surprising. But I
will point out a consequence of that difference, that is, Aquinas’s tendency
toward a moral instrumentalism alien in spirit to Aristotle’s ethics.
In the generation following St. Thomas some thinkers, including John
Duns Scotus, took issue with the eudaimonist framework altogether, arguing that we are called on to do what is right for its own sake, regardless of
its impact on our happiness. At first glance, Scotus’s contemporary Meister
Eckhart (ca.1260–1328?) seems to be echoing this view when he advises his
audience to “live without why,” that is, without a goal. But after sketching
Aristotle’s eudaimonism (in section 1) and exploring how Thomas’s moral
theology compares with it (section 2), I will argue that Eckhart is actually
a kind of eudaimonist. While no less Christian than his fellow Dominican
Thomas, his ethical views are in a way more faithful than Aquinas’s to the
spirit of Aristotle. They deserve serious scholarly attention.
I.
Is there in fact, or should there be, a supreme goal in our lives, by reference
to which we can determine the rightness of our day-to-day actions? Aristotle famously thought there is such a goal, happiness (eudaimonia), which
is not a subjective state of satisfaction, but rather consists in the complete
fulfillment of our human nature. As essentially rational beings with lives
that are also sensate and vegetative, our excellence consists in realizing
to the highest extent possible our distinctive capacities. This is achievable
only in a virtuous life in which on the one hand practical reason regularly
controls our sensory impulses (desires and emotions), and—even better,
though less common—wherein theoretical reason also devotes itself to
contemplation or study of the highest realities.4 Many of the virtues—e.g.,
justice, courage, generosity, etc.—are largely other-oriented. But in each
case the role of the virtue in one’s life is self-perfective. So, for instance,
courage moderates on the one hand natural fears and a tendency to save
oneself at the expense of others, and on the other an inclination to endanger oneself and others through reckless overconfidence. It is thus a part
and good fortune, Aristotle differed from other ancient champions of the virtues
such as Socrates and the Stoics.
3
The Aristotelian elements in Thomas’s ethical thought coexist, sometimes uneasily, with the long tradition of Christian, substantially Augustinian, teaching.
Thomas’s overall attitude and debts to Aristotle are a topic of ongoing debate, for
instance about the extent and import of Augustinian and other Neoplatonic influences on Thomas’s thinking.
4
There is scholarly disagreement—which I must ignore here—about how exactly to understand Aristotle’s final view of the relationship between the practical
and contemplative forms of life.
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of the perfection of human nature in that it honors one’s ties to others,
e.g., to family, friends or country, ties rooted in our nature as essentially
social beings. Just as a good carpenter qua carpenter builds houses well in
fulfilling her function, so too a virtuous human being acts courageously
because that is fulfilling her function qua human being; she is thus realizing her happiness or fulfillment. Eudaimonia is not simply a reward for
virtuous living; it is living virtuously.
Aristotle’s approach to ethics thus revolves around these central elements: First, there is the goal (telos) of life. Everyone agrees in calling it
happiness. Aristotle claims it is a function of our nature, and its attainment
a matter of our own efforts. Identifying the goal is the same as making it
the object of one’s will (boulēsis);5 while practical wisdom (phronēsis) enables
us to discern which of alternative actions available to us will promote attainment of the end. Hence his ethic is broadly teleological, that is, it aims
to discover, describe, and advocate a process of human development toward the goal of life.
Second, attainment of the goal consists in the performance, the actual
doing, of actions of a certain kind, that is, those identified by practical wisdom as right, in that they contribute to (by partially constituting) one’s
happiness. Essential to such actions is that they proceed from the right
sort of principles, that is, from virtues as habits which we develop, and in
the exercise of which (under the guidance of phronēsis) we live the best of
human lives. Aristotle distinguishes (e.g., at NE 1094 a 1ff.) action (praxis)
from production (poiesis); in the latter the “product beyond the activity” is
the point; in the former, it is the activity itself that matters: a just action is
a good-in-itself.
A serious danger for any teleological ethical theory is the tendency to
exalt the end over the means, turning the latter into a mere instrument to
realizing the former. Aristotle saw this threat of instrumentalization. His
solution was to make the virtues, friendship, and the like constituents of the
happy life. Justice, courage, etc. are their own reward, and at the same time
help constitute the good life by fulfilling our nature as rational animals. If
we are persuaded by Aristotle about the content of the good life, we do not
choose to be virtuous in order to achieve happiness as an extrinsic good,
something beyond. The just person is just because it is right to be so, i.e.,
fully consonant with her nature as a rational, social animal, but her conduct
is itself a realization of happiness. Indeed, I cannot be just if my action is
solely (or even principally) meant to attain some extrinsic goal: to instrumentalize a virtue is to destroy it (though Aristotle allows that we can act
justly for its own sake and because to do so partially constitutes our happiness or fulfillment, NE 1097b, 1–7). Such is Aristotle’s teleological eudaimonism, an ethic built on the notions of attaining the good life (happiness)
through, and in, the kind of virtuous action which fulfills one’s nature.
5
The role, or even presence, of the concept of will in Aristotle’s thought is controversial. I take it that his notion of boulēsis, the inclination toward—or wanting of—
the goal of life, is a central element in the complex medieval concept of voluntas. See
the discussion in Charles Kahn, “Discovering the Will from Aristotle to Augustine,”
in The Question of ‘Eclecticism’: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy, ed. John M. Dillon
and A. A. Long (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 103—126.
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I propose to compare Aquinas and Eckhart with Aristotle on these elements: the goal of life, the structure of human action, and the virtues. In
this process we should bear in mind correspondingly different senses in
which we might speak of teleology in ethics:
(A) First, an ethic might be concerned with moral development in that it
conceives as the (or a) central task of ethics to lead one from an unsatisfactory initial state of character to a perfected state (the telos or goal, eudaimonia, maturity, etc.) in which one is a fully developed moral agent. Call
this a teleological view of human life. It is typical of, though not exclusive to,
virtue-ethics.
(B) An ethic might allot an important role to the means-end aspect of
action in moral conduct. The end could be intrinsic, i.e., living virtuously
itself, but could equally be something extrinsic to the action, e.g., the
greatest happiness of the greatest number. (Kant’s ethic, by contrast, is
famously non-teleological in this sense, since its central focus is the agent’s
motive, and neither her goal nor the consequences of her conduct).
(C) Finally, a teleological ethic might see virtuous action as itself a means
to a further end. For instance, courage might be conceived as a good thing
primarily as being in a further way meritorious, where earning this further
merit from another (or others) is the real goal of life. So it is sometimes
said that in the “Homeric ethic” the honor or esteem of one’s peers is the
principal good. When the rightness of actions is derived from their serving
some such external goal, the resulting ethic is a form of consequentialism.
As noted, the danger here is an undermining of the virtues.
Aristotle’s eudaimonist ethic is teleological in the first way; and while
he thinks of virtuous action as a means to happiness, such action’s connection to happiness is internal and constitutive. I shall argue that Aquinas
is, in a way, a stronger teleologist than Aristotle: his connection of virtuous action to what he calls “perfect happiness” is external and by way of
merit. Eckhart, though he has a partially teleological account of our lives,
differs importantly from Aquinas with respect to each of these senses of
ethics and teleology, and—crucially—is a non-teleologist about action, in
one sense, and the virtues.
II.
When the Nicomachean Ethics first became available in Latin to Christian
thinkers in the thirteenth century, it elicited strong reactions. Some, but
not all, were opposed to the study of it in the universities. The Aristotelian eudaimonist conception of the good life, while attractively concise
and powerfully argued, was after all essentially pagan, lacking notions
of salvation, grace, creation, providence, etc. Without denying this point,
many wrote commentaries on it. Aquinas did so too, and then incorporated parts of it into his moral theology.
Among the works of Aquinas addressed to moral themes is his monumental textbook, the Summa Theologiae. In the latter, starting in the second
main part (the prima secundae, or 1a2ae),6 St. Thomas lays out his ethic in
6
Further citations to Thomas will be given in the text, and will refer to the 1a2ae
unless otherwise noted.
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a format somewhat like Aristotle’s: (a) in the ‘treatise on happiness’ (articles 1–5) he investigates the goal of life, that is, happiness or beatitude;
(b) the ‘treatise of human acts’ (articles 6–21) is his detailed analysis of
human action, including moral action; (c) the ‘treatises on the passions,
virtues and vices,’ as well as the Gospel Beatitudes (22–89), present his
views on the role of these elements in the moral life; while (d) in the
‘treatise on law’ (90–114) he sets out his influential view of natural law.
(The following segment of the Summa, the secunda secundae, is a detailed
theological investigation of individual virtues, where charity assumes the
central place.)
In the ‘treatise on happiness,’ “the centerpiece in the construction of
the Summa Theologiae,”7 Thomas for a while hews closely to Aristotle’s
argumentation: since “man’s ultimate end is his complete good” (1,6, ad
3), our happiness cannot consist in wealth, power, sensory pleasure, etc.,
as none of these can fully satisfy our desire. But Aquinas then goes on to
extend the point to virtue, contemplation or any “created good”: none of
them, nor all together, can fully satisfy us.8 In thus rejecting the notion
that a life of the virtues could constitute our happiness, Aquinas steps
decisively beyond the framework of Aristotle: our longing for fulfillment
implies that only the eternal possession of God in the Beatific Vision can
fulfill us (2, 8, resp.). The teleological drive built into our nature points
inexorably to this as its completion. The happiness we seek can be had
fully only in that Vision.
Such a completion, however, is beyond the capacity of our nature (5, 5,
resp.). Hence, from the point of view of virtue ethics, we find ourselves in
a dilemma: the most our unaided human nature is capable of is a limited
or “imperfect” (i.e., Aristotelian) happiness in this life; yet we long for a
perfect happiness that is beyond our means and could only be given us,
e.g., as a divine reward for our meritorious virtuous behavior. But can
merit and an extrinsic reward coexist with virtue in a coherent ethic? Aristotle thought not, and if we were to follow him, we would have to set aside
from ethics the Christian promise of salvation. For if salvation, conceived
as an extrinsic reward for meritorious conduct, is our true goal, the life
of the virtues is threatened by instrumentalization; yet if our virtues are
undermined, how can our conduct possibly merit salvation?
We will return to this question, but even at this point it may seem doubtful that Thomas’s approach, while clearly teleological and widely thought
7
Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “Beatitude and the Beatitudes in Aquinas’s Summa
Theologiae,” in The Pinckaers Reader: Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology, ed. John
Berkman and Craig Steven Titus (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of
America Press, 2005), p. 117.
8
As Kenny points out, Aristotle’s own conception of happiness vacillates in his
two major ethical works between the “perfect” good (that best of all activities, that
is, contemplation) and the “complete” good (that is, a set of activities so satisfying that nothing could be added to it that would make it more satisfying). Kenny
contends that Aquinas, though following the former line in his commentary on the
Nicomachean Ethics, sometimes avails himself of the latter, as here in the Summa. Cf.
Anthony Kenny, “Aquinas on Aristotelian Happiness,” in Aquinas’s Moral Theory:
Essays in Honor of Norman Kretzmann, ed. Scott MacDonald and Eleonore Stump,
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 15–27.
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to be eudaimonist,9 can be called “eudaimonist” in Aristotle’s sense. For
Aristotle the end or fulfillment of human beings consists in virtuous living, a form of life which is clearly open to us to choose (and certainly one
which no one else can give us). It represents the perfection of our human
nature. But for Christians this conception is at best incomplete. Our true
ultimate goal is not discoverable by reason, but known only through revelation, and it is not—so Thomas—the perfection of our human nature, but
rather something “beyond the nature of any created intellect” (1a, 62,1).
Hence, already in the treatise on happiness a substantial gap is obvious:
although Thomas uses Aristotle’s overall teleological framework, he must
dramatically alter Aristotle’s eudaimonism (which indeed no Christian
could embrace as the full account of our destiny). I will suggest that his alterations, when thought through, are so drastic that one must ask whether
his constellation of positions, i.e., a Christian teleological ethics that is not
eudaimonist in a sense at least analogous to Aristotle’s, is fully coherent.
Eckhart, I will argue, does not think so.
With respect to virtuous action, we may note, first, that Thomas’s analysis of human action is more detailed and developed than Aristotle’s, but
certainly at least as teleological. At the very beginning of the ‘treatise of
human acts’ (6–21) Aquinas writes:
[E]very agent or thing moved acts or is moved for an end . . . ; those
things which have a knowledge of the end [such as human beings]
are said to move themselves because there is in them a principle by
which they not only act but also act for an end. And consequently,
since both are from an intrinsic principle, to wit, that they act and
that they act for an end, the movements of such things are said to be
voluntary. (6, 1, resp.)
The same focus on the end or goal of actions is at the heart of Thomas’s
conception of their moral goodness and badness:
Now just as the being of a thing depends on the agent and the form,
so the goodness of a thing depends on its end . . . human actions
and other things, the goodness of which depends on something else,
have a measure of goodness from the end on which they depend.
(18, 1, resp.)
The “something else” on which “the goodness” of human actions depends
is the will, with its orientation to the end. For an action to be morally good,
the will must be intent on the right goal, a basically Aristotelian view.
However, Thomas’s account of the virtues goes far beyond that of his classical predecessor.
9
“Aquinas holds to an eudaimonistic ‘moral point of view’ . . . ,” Denis Bradley,
Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good: Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas’s Moral
Science (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1997), p. 53. Also:
“St. Thomas adopted a similar [i.e., to Aristotle’s] eudaemonological (sic) and teleological standpoint . . . ,” Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy, Vol. 2,
Mediaeval Philosophy, Part II (Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1962), p. 119.
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Measured simply by the sheer volume of the attention given to the virtues in his Summa, Thomas is clearly a virtue-ethicist. But as we saw, he
characterizes Aristotle’s version of eudaimonia as imperfect: a life of the
virtues cannot satisfy our deepest longing. Are we, then, what Sartre called
“a useless passion,” yearning for something we cannot attain?10 Thomas of
course thinks not. The Christian promise that the just will see God “face to
face” [I Corinthians, 13:12] must imply that our nature can be transformed
so as to become capable of this Beatific Vision. In the process of this transformation we receive the divine gift of grace in the form of supernatural
(“theological”) virtues that enable us to act meritoriously.11 The gist of his
view on grace can be put this way: for us to attain the completion we long
for in the Beatific Vision, we require God’s supernatural assistance in the
form both of a permanent alteration or restoration of our nature (sanctifying grace), and of ongoing assistance in the formation of the will and the
execution of actions (actual grace).
Let us return to the dilemma mentioned above. Thomas’s eudaimonism seems marked by a kind of instrumentalism: the goal of the Beatific
Vision is extrinsic to, and a reward for, the virtuous life. Is he then “an
egoistic rationalist,” someone for whom the point of virtuous behavior is
to be rewarded for it?12 A charge of egoism cannot really touch Aristotle,
if we understand egoism to be in tension with virtuous living. For Aristotle, the virtuous life is in fact the one most suited to the real interests
of the individual, so justice for example cannot truly conflict with genuine self-interest. But the plausibility of this claim is rooted in Aristotle’s
view that living virtuously is itself the perfection of our nature: instrumentalism has no toe-hold here. Not entirely so, for Thomas; on his view
the perfection of our nature is two-fold. Something like Aristotle’s view
may be right at the inferior “natural” level, but our inborn teleology
points beyond the sphere of nature: “Our heart is restless until it rests
in You,” according to the famous prayer of Augustine (Confessions, 1, 1).
We want more.
But neither is it quite right to call Thomas an egoist. For Aquinas, the
principal form grace takes in us is charity, the greatest of the theological virtues. Thomas means by charity no mere disposition to alms-giving
and the like, but nothing less than a form of the love with which God
The phrase appears in part 4, chapter 1 of Being and Nothingness, 1943.
Aquinas’s teachings on the topic of grace “are complex and difficult to follow,”
and their development over the course of his mature years reflects “his growing
pessimism over humanity’s natural faculties,” according to Alister McGrath, Justitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 3rd edition, 2005), p. 136. I restrict myself here to Thomas’s mature view in the Summa.
12
I borrow the phrase (in a slightly altered sense) from Scott MacDonald, “Egoistic Rationalism: Aquinas’s Basis for Christian Morality,” in Christian Theism and the
Problems of Philosophy, ed. Michael D. Beaty (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1990), pp. 327–354. Put perhaps over simply, MacDonald’s view is
that for Thomas human beings naturally seek their own complete good, and they
do so by means of the exercise of intellect and will. A critique of this position can
be found in chapter 3 of Thomas Osborne, Love of Self and Love of God in ThirteenthCentury Ethics (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005).
10
11
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loves Himself, i.e., a love of God for God’s own perfect goodness, a love
beyond ordinary human ability and—very importantly—not self-serving.
As Brian Davies puts it, “by charity we share in what God is from eternity
insofar as we love God in the way God loves God . . . it is the presence [in
us] of the Holy Spirit because it is caused by the Holy Spirit, who thereby
produces in us what love is in God.”13 Charity enables us to act in selfless
ways that are by definition done for the love of God, not for the sake of a
reward, though such acts merit the Beatific Vision.
The Christian revelation points to an avenue that leads to a perfect beatitude undreamt of by the ancients: God offers to make us deiform, “participants in the divine nature” (2 Peter 1:3 f.). As a result those who are saved
can, in patria, enjoy a knowledge of the divine essence, while in this life (in
via) God’s grace blesses them with faith, hope and charity, each of which
gives a foretaste of the joys of heaven. Indeed, these three “theological virtues” so transform the lives of the faithful that even those virtues praised
by the ancients are made new, inspiring just or courageous actions that are
now performed from charity, i.e., from the love of God for God’s own sake.
This, then, is the best life possible for human beings in via, a life in which
we perform virtuous and meritorious deeds out of charity.
Such a life can hardly be called egoism. But has Thomas then, in describing the graced lives of the truly faithful, thereby avoided ethical instrumentalism altogether? Is his system a variant on that of Aristotle, who
as we saw thought of virtuous behavior as done for its own sake and for
the sake of happiness? Can we read him as saying that an action is meritorious (and that God rewards that action in the Beatific Vision), while
at the same time the agent does not undertake it as a means to this end?
Indeed, could we not say the action is meritorious precisely because it is
not intended as a means to any further end?14
Although Thomas sometimes seems to suggest such a non-instrumental view of the theologically virtuous life, it is not his main point. In the
Question on the theological virtues (62) he claims they “direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is
directed to his connatural end.” In particular, by hope “the will is directed
to this [supernatural] end . . . as something attainable” (62, 3, resp., emphases
added). In this life, we believe by faith in the possibility of the Beatific Vision; we are inspired by grace to hope for it; by grace we perform actions
meritorious of it (109, 5, ad 1); while by charity, i.e., the divine love itself
in us through grace, we enjoy a certain anticipation of the union we hope
for in the life to come. In other words, we are meant to aspire to the Beatific
Vision, an aspiration which we know can only be fulfilled as a reward for
our merits.
My point can be made in another way, i.e., by asking, is this life of the
theological virtues itself our beatitudo, our happiness? It is clearly the best
we can hope for in this life, and so we must think of it as a certain level
of happiness. But surely a Thomist Christian should be disappointed if
13
Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992),
pp. 288–289.
14
I am indebted for this important question to an anonymous reviewer for this
journal.
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this were “all” she were to attain. For although her Christian life is the
best one possible in via, and is to an extent chosen for its own sake, she
certainly also wants above all the Beatific Vision: it represents her deepest desire. The theological virtues, for all Thomas’s talk of “for their own
sake,” are essentially aimed at attaining a Good beyond themselves, an
end state which Thomas repeatedly speaks of as a “reward.”15 Such an
ethic, while not egoistic, is nonetheless clearly consequentialist. But this
creates an unavoidable, and perhaps untenable, tension. The Christian
is in effect told by Thomas that, God willing, her deepest desire will be
fulfilled, but only if she succeeds in both letting and not letting it motivate
her actions.
On reflection, one might wonder if anything besides some kind of consequentialism is possible for a medieval Christian moral philosopher within
the broadly eudaimonistic framework. Duns Scotus, as mentioned earlier,
anticipated more modern developments by rejecting (or curtailing) eudaimonism itself. But Meister Eckhart did not. Yet he speaks of “living without why.” What could that mean? Let us turn now to see.
III.
Thus far we have seen some important similarities and differences between the virtue-ethical systems of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Each
seeks to be a eudaimonist, viewing the goal of happiness as something to
be achieved through a process of acquiring (or otherwise coming to possess) various virtues; and each thinks of action, conceived in means-end
terms, as occupying a crucial place in the quest for the happy life. The
principal difference between them, we saw, lies in their respective conceptions of the virtues (what they are, how we come to have them), and their
place in the happy life. For Aristotle, they are excellences of mind and
character acquired by education and effort, and the virtuous life constitutes eudaimonia; while for Thomas even a life of the divinely infused virtues is inferior to, and preparatory for, the reward of bliss that awaits the
just in Heaven. In Meister Eckhart we encounter a third, and importantly
different, version of virtue-eudaimonism.
Eckhart von Hochheim, born in Thuringia around 1260 when Thomas
was coming into his prime, became an eminent philosopher / theologian
and one of Aquinas’s successors on the Dominican chair for theology at
the University of Paris. He was accorded the unusual honor of appointment to this rotating chair twice (1302–1303 and 1311–1313). In between
he held important administrative posts in his order. After completing his
second professorship, Eckhart was given special pastoral assignments by
his superiors that called for much vernacular preaching in the Rhineland.
15
As Joseph Wawrykow says, “When speaking of merit [in Question 114]
Thomas repeatedly refers to the life of the Christian as a ‘journey’ or ‘movement.’
The basic idea here is that the Christian life is a journey in which one who is in
grace moves further away from sin and draws nearer to God through the good
actions / merits one performs. Eventually the Christian will attain in this way the
ultimate destination of this journey, God Himself.” In God’s Grace and Human Action
(Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), p. 267, n. 13, emphasis
added.
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As one of the first to put philosophical and theological terminology into
Middle High German, he became a celebrated, indeed notorious figure in
the pulpit. In the religious turbulence of the early fourteenth century he
was eventually accused of heresy and tried before the Inquisition. In 1329
Pope John XXII, who had canonized Thomas Aquinas a few years before,
condemned as heretical or misleading twenty-eight propositions from
Eckhart’s writings, a substantial number of which expressed his criticisms
of aspects of teleological ethics.16
Although generally regarded as a Neoplatonist on whom the works of
Augustine had an enormous impact, “there is,” as Bernard McGinn has
pointed out, “no philosopher [Eckhart] knew better or cited more often
than Aristotle.”17 Furthermore, he quotes St. Thomas hundreds of times,
especially in his Latin writings. And Eckhart repeatedly uses the standard
Aristotelian framework of final causality, often as a source of comparisons
between the workings of nature and the human quest for happiness. A
typical example is the opening paragraph of his Latin Commentary on John
1, 43, Sequere me (“Follow me”):
First of all one must know that through the creation God says and
proclaims, advises and orders all creatures—precisely by creating
them—to follow Him, the First Cause of their entire being, to orient
themselves to Him, to return to Him and hurry to Him according to
the Scripture: “To the place from which the waters flow they shall
return” [Ecclesiates, I, 7]. This is why the creature by its nature loves
God, indeed more than itself.18
But if “all creatures” are meant to “orient themselves” to God, “to return to Him and hurry to Him,” it is surprising that Eckhart seems to
criticize teleological conceptions of the good life, especially as the official
Dominican theologian, Aquinas, had so extensively and authoritatively
formulated one such conception during Eckhart’s own lifetime. Eckhart’s
flat and repeated rejection of an intuitively plausible approach to such
a centrally important issue, namely how we should live, is unusual and
surprising.19 His rejection is furthermore often couched in memorable
16
The Papal Bull In agro dominico of March 27, 1329 is available in English in
Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense, trans.
and intro. E. Colledge, O.S.A. and B. McGinn (New York: Paulist Press, 1981). Articles 7 through 22 deal with Eckhart’s views on how we should live. The Bull
denounces Eckhart in harsh terms. But in 1985 Pope John Paul II, himself a philosopher, spoke approvingly of Eckhart’s central teachings.
17
Bernard McGinn, The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 2001), p. 168.
18
Meister Eckhart, Lateinische Werke (hereafter LW—the German works, Deutsche
Werke, are cited as DW—Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1936—), vol. 3, p. 189.
Further references are given in brackets in the text. The English translations are,
unless otherwise noted, from M. O’C. Walshe, Meister Eckhart: Sermons and Treatises, 3 volumes (Shaftsbury [Dorset]: Element Books, 1979, 1981, 1987).
19
Eckhart’s critique, in both German and Latin works, of teleological eudaimonism is never explicitly stated as a criticism of Thomas or Aristotle. He comes close
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(and what seems deliberately provocative) imagery—at one point he calls
those who think of salvation in teleological terms esel (“asses”).
We begin, as before, with the central question of the goal of life. Eckhart could say with Aristotle that we want to be happy, that our happiness is a function of our nature, and that we are initially de facto ignorant
of what it consists in. He agrees too that its attainment requires effort
on our part. So Eckhart’s ethic, as with Aristotle and Thomas, is broadly
teleological, that is, it aims to discover, describe, and advocate a process
of human development toward the goal of life. It is also a virtue ethic,
since justice and the like play a central role. But he gives all these ideas a
radical twist. In vernacular sermon 1, Jesus intravit in templum (“Jesus entered the Temple,” DW 1, 4 ff.), Eckhart preaches on the Gospel text (Matthew 21:12) which tells of Jesus driving the merchants from the temple.
After identifying, in typically allegorical fashion,20 the temple with the
(highest part of the) soul, Eckhart asks what the Evangelist meant by the
merchants in the temple / soul. He answers that the merchants (and he
explicitly says he means here “none but good people”) are those whose
inclination it is to
do good works to the glory of God, such as fasts, vigils, prayers and
the rest, all kinds of good works, but [to] do them in order that our
Lord may give them something in return, or that God may do something they wish for—all these are merchants. That is plain to see, for
they want to give one thing in exchange for another, and so to barter
with our Lord. (p. 7)
Eckhart’s counterpart to the “spiritual merchant”21 is the “just person” (der
gerehte, in his Middle High German). In sermon 6, Justi vivent in aeternum
(“The just shall live forever,” DW 1, 99 ff.), Eckhart explains that the just
person is one “who gives to God His due, and to the saints and angels
theirs, and to his fellow man what is his.” It is in the first of these that the
contrast to the merchant most strikingly emerges:
God’s due is honor. Who are they who honor God? Those who have
gone completely out of themselves and seek not their own in anything at all, whatever it may be, whether great or small; who pay
special heed to nothing anywhere, neither above nor below nor next
to nor on themselves; who aim not at possessions or honors or comto doing so, however, in German sermon 101, where he declares the superiority of
complete detachment (“to keep still and silent . . . and let God speak and work”) to
a more active, one could say Aristotelian or Thomist, form of contemplation (“to
do something . . . to imagine and think about God”). DW 4, vol. 1, p. 354; Walshe,
vol. 1, p. 6.
20
I have discussed Eckhart’s hermeneutical approach in “Applicatio and Explicatio in Gadamer and Eckhart,” in Gadamer’s Century: Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg
Gadamer, ed. Jeff Malpas, Ulrich Arnswald, and Jens Kertscher (Cambridge MA
and London: The MIT Press, 2002).
21
Eckhart appears to have principally in mind those monks, nuns, and others
who think that their ascetic practices will assure salvation for themselves.
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fort or pleasure or utility or inwardness or holiness or reward or heaven; and who have renounced all of this, all that is theirs. From such
people God has honor, and they honor God in the proper sense and
give Him his due. (p. 100, emphasis added)
Again, in sermon 41, Qui sequitur justitiam (“They who pursue justice,”
DW 2), Eckhart says:
[The just man] wants and seeks nothing, for he knows no why. He
acts without a why just in the same way as God does; and just as life
lives for its own sake and seeks no why for the sake of which it lives,
so too the just man knows no why for the sake of which he would do
something. (pp. 288–289)
Again, we are told in sermon 6 that the truly just differ from those who
merely “want what God wants . . . but [who] if they should fall sick, would
wish it were God’s will that they should be better;” by contrast, “the just
have no will at all: whatever God wills, it is all one to them, however great
the hardship” (p. 102, emphasis added). Such people “are so set on justice
that if God were not just they would not care a bean for God” (p. 103); further, “whoever understands about the just man and justice understands
all that I am saying” (p. 105). What does all this mean?
For Aristotle, the just or virtuous life is itself (a central aspect of) happiness, so in a sense he too could say, “The just man wants and seeks
nothing [other than justice], he knows no why” in acting virtuously. For
Thomas, on the other hand, although the just person does what is just
for its own sake, such behavior does not constitute complete happiness;
at best it may merit it. Thus, in his moral theology a door is (perhaps
inadvertently) opened to spiritual or ethical mercantilism, to virtuous
behavior as a means of barter. And it is this door that Eckhart means
to close, even though such behavior was (and still is) regularly encouraged by the Church. What does Eckhart think is lacking in behavior that,
to ordinary common sense, not to mention the Church hierarchy, seems
commendable? And why does he dwell on “going out of oneself,” elsewhere identified as detachment (abegescheidenheit), of which he says in
the treatise “On Detachment” that it “surpasses all things, for all virtues
have some regard to creatures, but detachment is free of all creatures”
(DW 5, p. 405)?
For Eckhart, what is wrong with the merchant mentality in the search
for eudaimonia is that merchants have made the most fundamental of
mistakes, i.e., who—or what—God is, and thus what they are themselves:
knowledge of these things is essential if one is to know what eudaimonia
consists in. In his Latin Commentary on the Gospel of John, Eckhart sees in
the Gospel’s opening passage, “In principio erat verbum . . . ,” (usually
rendered: “In the beginning was the Word . . . ”) a confirmation of his
radical Parisian thesis of 1302: Deus est intelligere, (“God is understanding / thinking”—as opposed to: being, as Thomas taught—LW 5, p. 40).
“In principio erat verbum” he renders as: the Word was in the Principle
(or Source), i.e., in God. A word (verbum, logos) presupposes a mind,
and a mind is constituted by, i.e., is nothing but, its thinking (knowing,

286

Faith and Philosophy

understanding).22 Trading on the other meaning of logos, i.e., idea, Eckhart
also takes the phrase as declaring the priority of the idea (or form) over
its exempla: the idea (or form) that defines the exempla is found first and
foremost “in the principle,” the pure Idea. Further, the form or idea in the
exemplum is the same (only more eminently) in the principle as in the exemplum or product (also called “son,” i.e., “offspring,” a locution Eckhart
particularly likes, and which implies that the principle is “father”). In his
doctrine of the transcendental perfections (being, unity, truth, goodness,
but sometimes also wisdom and justice) Eckhart can thus identify the
perfections with God, as God’s “proper attributes” (propria)—he says, for
instance, esse est deus, i.e., being is most truly said of God, not of creatures.23 He can also claim that their manifestations, e.g., a just person (justus), are not distinct from Justice itself, insofar as (inquantum) s / he is just:
the justice that such a person manifests is the same justice that itself is
God. What Eckhart is saying here about goodness itself and justice itself
is part of his understanding of analogy: a perfection such as goodness is
properly present only in God, while the goodness of the good person is
‘adopted’; goodness itself is the original (or Principle), and the adopted
goodness manifested in the person, character, or behavior of the good
person is an image or offspring of it. This is not to identify the concrete,
individual just person with God, which would make no sense; but it does
imply that, were this person to detach from her particularities (her propria
or individual properties) and recognize as her true reality what she shares
with the Principle, she would become, to that extent, “God’s Offspring,”
and hence indistinct from God, her Source.24
Thus the just person, insofar as she is just, “acts without a why in the
same way as God does,” since she is in this way not distinct from God. But
the spiritual merchant, who acts for a why, ipso facto fails to be just, and
does not give God His due. Nor does the merchant give himself his own
due, since he mistakenly pins his hopes of salvation on his own particular
(teleologically oriented) efforts, whereas in fact these directly impede his
progress, since they reinforce the very thing that separates us from God,
our belief in our own metaphysical autonomy as the spatio-temporal individuals we take ourselves to be. In reality, whether we realize it or not, we
are literally nothing without God, and as human beings are one with God
in “the ground of the soul.” Thus to act out of this truest self is eo ipso to
do God’s will, not our own, and to act justly. God never acts as a merchant,
22
Eckhart takes his inspiration here from Aristotle, who wrote of the mind that
“it is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing” (De Anima 429a24). Thus, for
Eckhart, it is above, prior to, being.
23
“Being is God” is the first proposition in the General Prologue to the Tripartite
Work, LW 1, p. 156. In the Commentary on John Eckhart remarks that being, one, true
and good are God’s “domestic servants,” whereas for creatures these perfections
are “guests and foreigners.” LW 3, pp. 83–84.
24
This doctrine of the transcendentals is also spelled out, with a strong focus on
the moral virtues (goodness, justice), in the mature German treatise Liber ‘Benedictus’ where Eckhart says, e.g., “Goodness begets itself and all that it is in the good
man, and the good man receives all his being, knowledge, love and energy from
the heart and inmost depth of goodness, and from that alone. The good man and
goodness are nothing but one goodness . . . ” DW 5, p. 9.
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seeking something further—for what could God lack? “He is perfectly free
in His acts, which he does out of true love. So too does a person who is one
with God: she is perfectly free in her acts, she does them for love, without
‘why’—solely to glorify God and not seeking her own therein, and God
works in her” (DW 1, p. 9).
In our everyday lives, we are (and are surrounded by) persons who are
at best intermittently good and just. If manifesting these characteristics is,
or is connected, somehow with the goal of life, what does it take to become
and to be good (just, wise, etc.) as God is? On Eckhart’s view, this is not
self-evident, though he thinks the truth of it was discovered by some of
the ancient pagan philosophers and is also revealed in Scripture (for those
who have the art to read it properly). The key lies in a practice foreign
to Aristotle. Indeed, the extent of Eckhart’s departure from Aristotelianism shows itself in the supreme value he puts on detachment (sometimes
called humility or obedience).25 For Eckhart detachment, or “turning decisively to God,” is a propaedeutic to genuine virtue. For it is only by taking
leave of our attachment to a false conception of ourselves that we are able
to live the genuine life of happiness and virtue. Hence the crucial step in
the quest for eudaimonia is less about doing (as in Aristotle and Aquinas)
than undoing.
Detachment is an acknowledgement that—and this is the teleological
element in Eckhart’s conception of the good life—we can (and must) “go
out” of our everyday way of thinking, turn away from creaturely multiplicity in order to achieve or accept our fulfillment. According to Genesis
I, 26, we humans alone were created “in God’s own image and likeness.”
Since it is God’s nature to be incomparable (that is, “like to nothing else”)
and free, we too must become “like to nothing” and “free” by detaching
our minds from identification with our finite particularities, what Eckhart repeatedly calls our eigenschaften, literally “properties” (propria), our
personal characteristics and rootedness in the particularities of time and
space.26 For Eckhart, human nature in its truth is what one might call a
form of emptiness, an image of the Divine Emptiness (as intelligere), and the
attempt to conform one’s actual self to one’s essential nature is the crucial
first step on the road to fulfillment.27 For, “Whenever a man in obedience
25
Eckhart in various places gives a variety of names to the “ground-act” in which
one turns decisively toward God, e.g., calling it “humility” (in German sermons
14, 15, 16b, 54a, 55), “obedience” in the Talks of Instruction, etc. Cf. Theo Kobusch,
“Mystik als Metaphysik des moralischen Seins,” in Abendländische Mystik im Mittelalter: Symposion Kloster Engelberg 1984, ed. Kurt Ruh (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzlersche
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1986, hereafter Mystik), p. 53.
26
“God’s being is like nothing; in it is neither image nor form” (DW 1, p. 107).
Eckhart, unlike Thomas, agrees with Moses Maimonides and various Neoplatonists that no positive assertions at all can be made of God. He speaks instead,
in his commentary on Exodus, of the negatio negationis as the “purest and fullest
affirmation” (LW 2, p. 77, line 11). The matter is discussed in Burkhard Mojsisch,
Meister Eckhart: Analogy, Univocity, and Unity, hereafter Analogy, trans., preface and
appendix by Orrin F. Summerell (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co.,
2001), chap. 5.
27
Alessandra Beccarisi stresses this developmental aspect of Eckhart’s ethics
in her commentary on sermon 1. Eckhart calls to our attention “the intellectual
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goes out of his own and gives up what is his, in the same moment God
must go in there.”28
If indeed “God and I are one,” in Eckhart’s special sense (a thesis never
espoused by Aquinas, much less Aristotle), then the realization of this
unity is of the highest importance. According to Dietmar Mieth, Eckhart
teaches that “one should not locate happiness in the beatific vision, but
rather in the unity [with God] in being” itself.29 But whether we recognize
it or not, this unity is already ours. Of course since, as Eckhart wrote, “being is God,” there is no question of any ontological separation from our
Source. But as rational beings, the crucial thing for us is the consciousness
of this unity, an awareness that need not involve any visionary experience, but which is the core of what is often (and perhaps misleadingly)
called Eckhart’s “mysticism.” In any event, achieving this awareness is
the decisive step toward our eudaimonia, and it is taken by changing our
minds through detachment.
But eudaimonia does not end with the fact, or even the blissful realization, of this oneness. As the highest virtues—goodness, justice, wisdom—
are identified as transcendental realities with God,30 the newly aware
person recognizes that his unity with God amounts to a unity with these
virtues themselves. As Rolf Schönberger puts it, “The unity of man with
God is thus an ontological fact and at the same time a norm. Now it is first
and foremost from this fact that the peculiar structure of what one calls
‘mystical ethics’ results . . . the ‘should’ [of ethics] follows not only from
man’s goal-determined being,”31 that is, from his final cause (as in Aristotle), but also and especially from his inner nature or formal cause, which
is his emptiness and freedom as the image of God. Thus Schönberger can
speak of “Eckhart’s ontologizing of ethics.”32
experience of a person who has understood the nothingness of his creaturely dimension, and who seeks for his being a firmer ground, which of course can be
found in none of the creaturely dimensions. . . . And here this person comes to the
following conclusion: he understands that God is the ground, the substance, and
being of his own soul. . . . Man receives his entire being from God alone, but not
as being-for-itself or as being that belongs to itself, but as being-from-God.” “Zu
Predigt 1: Intravit Jesus in templum,” in Lectura Eckhardi II. Predigten Meister Eckharts
von Fachgelehrten gelesen und gedeutet, ed. Georg Steer and Loris Sturlese (Stuttgart:
Kohlhammer Verlag, 2003, hereafter Lectura II), pp. 19–20.
28
The Talks of Instruction, DW 5, p. 187.
29
In “zu Predigt 86: Intravit Jesus in quoddam castellum,” in Lectura II, p. 165. Mieth is referring to the German treatise, The Nobleman, DW 5, p. 117, lines 19–21,
where Eckhart writes: “So too, I say, the nobleman takes and draws his entire being, his life, and his happiness simply from God alone, with God, and in God, and
not from knowing-God, or the vision of God, or loving-God and the like.”
30
“It has been written that a virtue is no virtue unless it comes from God or
through God: one of these things must always be. If it were otherwise, it would
not be a virtue; for whatever one seeks without God is too small. Virtue is God or
without mediation in God.” (Sermon 41, DW 2, p. 296)
31
Rolf Schönberger, “Secundum rationem esse: Zur Ontologisierung der Ethik
bei Meister Eckhart,” in ΟΙΚΕΙΩΣΙΣ: Festschrift für Robert Spaemann, ed. Reinhard
Löw, (Acta Humaniora, Weinheim: VCH, 1987), p. 262, hereafter Festschrift.
32
A clear statement of this ontologizing is Eckhart’s “virtue is God,” (see note 30).
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Since Eckhart’s focus on the realization of our ultimate unity with God
as our blessedness is intimately connected with his unusual approach to
the virtues, and since these two together explain his initially baffling injunction to “live without why,” I proceed next to his treatment of virtue.
In a passage from his Commentary on the Gospel of John Eckhart describes
goodness as a state of being:
In every good work there are two things to consider, the inner and
the outer act. The former is in the soul, in the will, and it is this that is
truly praiseworthy, meritorious and divine, and God brings it about
in us . . . this is the act of virtue, which makes both the person who
has it and also the external act good. . . . The inner act, which is
divine, can be neither interrupted nor hindered; it is constantly at
work, neither sleeping nor slumbering, but watching over the person
who possesses it. (LW 3, pp. 510–511)
He then proceeds to give as “an appropriate example” of the “inner act”
the inclination of a stone to fall, i.e., a formal cause.33 Just as a stone’s natural heaviness can be impeded by “hindrance” and by what Aristotle called
“violent motion,” so too our “God-formedness” can be impeded, violated
when we allow ourselves to be distracted by the particularities of life and
our own finite, self-centered purposes, what Eckhart sums up laconically
as “hoc et hoc.” But when we “go out” of our (finite) selves, then, as Eckhart
puts it, “God must go in there.” But with the entrance of God into the
soul, the soul “becomes by grace of adoption what the Son is by nature”
(LW 3, p. 90). Whereupon, in Eckhart’s most famous image, “The Father
bears His Son in the inmost source,” that is, in the shared ground of both
God and the soul; “out of that the Holy Spirit blossoms forth, and then
there arises in God a will that belongs to the soul” (5b, DW 1, pp. 93f.).
This “birth of God’s Son in the soul” thus transforms the finite, historical
individual’s self-awareness to become that of an image of the divine and
thus a fountain of virtue who, like God, performs just / good / wise deeds
simply because they are just / good / wise. Virtuous acts “pour forth” from
such an individual with no further goal or purpose in mind. Their role in
the drama of salvation is never that of means to the end (a role they play,
in part, in Thomas), nor that of constituting the goal (Aristotle), but are
rather a manifestation of the goal’s already having been attained.34
Unlike Thomas, Eckhart does not lay much stress on the distinction
between “infused” and “acquired” virtues: all genuine virtues are really in
God, and in us only by grace (in this they differ from our very being only
in that they require that we “go out of our creatureliness,” i.e., detach).35
He says in his Sermons and Lectures on Ecclesiasticus:
33
In the Aristotelian physics of that time gravity was seen as an intrinsic property of objects, essential to their corporeality.
34
“In place of a guarantee [of salvation] via works, we have in them the expression of the Guarantor and of what has been guaranteed [i.e., salvation]: the
imprinted seal.” Mieth, in Lectura II, p. 173.
35
Eckhart’s treatment of grace with respect to virtue has thus far received surprisingly little scholarly attention.
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[B]eing and every perfection, particularly the general ones such as
being, oneness, truth, goodness, light, justice and the like are said
analogously of God and creatures. From this it follows that goodness, justice, and the like [in creatures] have their goodness entirely
from a being outside of themselves, that is, God, to which they stand
in an analogous relationship. (LW 2, p. 281)
And a few pages earlier:
Every finite being . . . has its being not from itself, but from a superior
being for which it thirsts, hungers, and longs. . . . Thus it thirsts for
the presence of the superior, and one can more properly say that it
continually receives its being than that it has it as its own fixed or
even partially fixed possession. (LW 2, p. 274)
From the vantage-point of one’s own finite being, one can mistakenly
think one has in oneself a firm and fixed just character, just as one is
tempted to think of oneself as an autonomous substance in one’s own
right.36 What is at first glance puzzling is that Eckhart seems to be denying that the just person really is just, as we usually understand this in
terms of a habit (acquired or infused). He is aware of this problem, and
seeks to allay the worry:
What we want to say is that the virtues—justice and the like—are
something more like gradually proceeding conformations than
something impressed and remaining firmly rooted in the virtuous
person. They are in a constant becoming, like the luster of light in
its medium and the image in a mirror. (Commentary on the Book of
Wisdom, LW 2, p. 368)
The metaphor of the “image” is a particular favorite with Eckhart, since
the image is totally dependent for its being on the item imaged.
The person who has “gone out of herself” has given up the notion that
her eudaimonia is a matter of fulfilling her particular purposes, be they
banal and everyday or sublime and far-reaching. But it would be mistaken
to think that she is meant to withdraw into quietism or non-action. We
shall look more closely in a moment at the unusual notion of living and
acting “without why,” but for now we should note that to the extent she
is unified with justice (for example), the just person acts justly, even as
the released stone falls because of its “inner act.” Paradoxical as it may
sound, just (and good and wise) action becomes natural to such a person
precisely in her state of detachment. Eckhart’s “mysticism” has no more
to do with avoiding the world than with “mystical experiences,” but it has
36
Both assumptions would, incidentally, be true on Thomas’s understanding
of analogy, according to which it is equally true to say that God is and that I am,
though the verb ‘to be’ is used analogously, not univocally, in the two cases. Cf.,
e.g., Summa Theologiae 1a, 13, 5; whereas Eckhart says that “God alone properly
speaking exists and is called being, one, true and good,” Tabula Prologorum, LW 1,
p. 132.
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much to do with the realization of one’s unity with God and its results in
action: as Mieth notes, Eckhart “anticipated the idea of the just person as
an in actione contemplativus.”37
Mieth has written extensively on the active aspect of Eckhart’s thought.38
He points out that Eckhart has given us two examples of such “active contemplatives.” One was Martha (of the Gospel story of Martha and Mary,
Luke 10, 38–42), the other, St. Elisabeth of Hungary. Eckhart could say of
each that she was “so well grounded in her essence that her activity was
no hindrance to her.” Of Elisabeth he tells his audience:
when her outward comforts failed her, she fled to Him to whom all
creatures flee, setting at naught the world and self. In that way she
transcended self and scorned the scorn of men, so that it did not
touch her and she lost none of her perfection. Her desire was to wash
and tend sick and filthy people with a pure heart.39
Eckhart seems to have wanted, here and in the very first sermon (DW 1, p.
1) cited above, to counter certain forms of ascetic spiritual practice. When
Elisabeth wanted to renounce her title and her wealth, she was prevented,
but these worldly advantages (a kind of particularity or “hoc et hoc” for
Eckhart) meant nothing to her and so she could use them without attachment in the cause of justice and compassion. In sermon 86 it is not Mary,
the sister who famously sits at the feet of Jesus to absorb everything he
says, but rather Martha, who busily tends to the needs of the guest and
the household, who exemplifies “groundedness in the essence,” and from
that ground does her good works.
Let us turn now to the notion of action itself in order to consider Eckhart’s striking injunction to “live without why.” How is that possible if
meaningful action can, for the most part, only be conceived in teleological, that is, means-end, terms? When we ask an agent why she did this
or that, we often expect to be told her goal or intention in what she did.
And yet Eckhart says, in sermon 5b: “If you were to ask a genuine man
who acted from his own ground, ‘Why do you act?’ if he were to answer
properly he would simply say, ‘I act because I act.’” But in real life such an
answer would likely be regarded as either disingenuous or a rebuff to the
questioner. Could Eckhart seriously be proposing that we eliminate the
teleological framework altogether?
37
In Lectura II, p. 164. The Latin epithet comes from Jerónimo Nadal, a sixteenth century Jesuit who advocated being contemplative in prayer and likewise
in action.
38
In addition to the works cited directly in this essay, see also his Die Einheit
von vita activa und vita contemplativa in den deutschen Predigten und Traktaten Meister
Eckharts und bei Johannes Tauler (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 1969).
39
The first quoted sentence is from Sermon 86 (DW 3, p. 491). The sermon
treats of Jesus’ visit to the home of Martha and Mary, in which Eckhart portrays
the “contemplatively active” Martha as the one who deserves the highest praise;
the second citation is from Sermon 32 on St. Elisabeth (DW 2, p. 147), a royal
woman of the 13th c. who was devoted to the poor and the sick, and became their
patroness.
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No, I think not. Take again the example of the stone, whose inner inclination is realized by falling in the appropriate circumstances. So too
the good / just / wise person’s inclinations are realized, as Kobusch says, in
“the concrete moral action,” which “is characterized by the fact that it has
its meaning in itself. Just as God performs all his works ‘without a why,’
and life is lived for its own sake, without needing to seek for a purpose
outside of itself, so too the moral person as such acts ‘without a why,’
because he regards his activity as meaningful and purposeful in itself, an
effect of the birth of the Son in the person.”40 Eckhart’s “ontologization”
of ethics, his stress on what we are and thus how we should act, forces
us to distinguish between the inner act and the outer act: if an agent has
“gone out” of her everyday self and recognized her true identity in the
divine Source, then her ‘inner act’ has become justice, while her outer act
is its concretization in given empirical circumstances, e.g., St. Elisabeth’s
attending to the needs of a particular poor person. For Eckhart, what is
moral per se about her action is the inner act; indeed, the same outer act
(say, alms-giving) could be performed by a “spiritual merchant,” but since
it would not be performed for its own sake, i.e., from justice, it would not
express a virtue.
I want to suggest that what Eckhart means by the “inner act” of the
just person, in spite of the associations of the term in modern philosophy,
is not the agent’s intention. Indeed, the intention is an integral part of the
outer act; it makes the outer act the spatio-temporal particular that it is,
e.g., taking care of a sick person. Eckhart’s “inner act,” by contrast, is (part
of) the agent’s nature, as seen in the example of the stone and its inclination to fall. Our human nature “by adoption” (i.e., by grace) is an image or
offspring of the divine nature. It hence can express itself outwardly only in
acts of virtue, that is, acts of justice, goodness, etc., marked by free choice,
performed for their own sake, and proceeding from internal dispositions.
For Aristotle these are fixed habits, but for Eckhart they “are something
more like gradually proceeding conformations” of the individual to the
divine source. This line of thought is powerfully developed in a lengthy
passage in the Liber ‘Benedictus,’ where Eckhart says in part, “We have a
clear illustration of this teaching [on inner and outer work] in a stone. . . .
In the same way I say that virtue has an inner work: a will and tendency
toward all good and a flight from and repugnance to all that is bad, evil
and incompatible with God and goodness.”41
In the (quasi-)Aristotelian framework of thought common to both
Thomas Aquinas and Eckhart, the virtues and the virtuous actions to
which they give rise play a central role. Indeed, for Aristotle they are the
very essence of happiness, and it is fundamental to his conception of virtuous action qua virtuous that it is performed for its own sake. Aquinas,
as we saw, argues that a life of virtuous behavior for its own sake is not
our true happiness; virtuous behavior remains central, but now is largely
a means to the end, the Beatific Vision.

Kobusch, Mystik, p. 58.
DW 5, p. 39. The entire long passage runs from page 38, line 3 to page 42, line
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Eckhart, for all his distance from Aristotle on the question of the nature
of our blessedness, avoids Aquinas’s uncoupling of virtuous action from
our goal. Indeed, his idea that the just person qua just acts justly for its
own sake, and not for some goal distinct from it, is Aristotelian through
and through. So another way to express the idea of “living without why”
would be to say: “live virtuously.” That is, be just, good, wise, temperate,
courageous, etc., without thought of reward: do not be a merchant. A third
way to put Eckhart’s point might be this: since on his view of analogy our
very being is adopted from the divine being, and since the human mode of
being is to live and live rationally, it follows that for us to “live genuinely”
is to live a life of the virtues, that is, to live without why.
What then could the “genuine man” mean when he says “I act because
I act”? Note, first, that this curt answer is somewhat misleading. Recall
what Eckhart says of the just person in Sermon 6: “The just are so set on
justice that if God were not just, they would not care a bean for God.”
The motivation of the “genuine man” does have content, but it comes
from the “inner act,” and not from anything whatsoever considered to be
outside him:
one should not work for any ‘why,’ neither for God nor one’s honor
nor for anything at all that is outside of oneself, but only for that which
is one’s own being and one’s own life within oneself. (Ibid., p. 113)
Kurt Flasch puts it this way: “The just person, insofar as he is just, is justice; next to that, heaven and earth, purgatory and hell count for nothing.
This leads to the elimination of the reward-motive and every means-end construction of life. Life is its own goal. The just person lives in justice; he lives
not to do the will of God and thereby attain heaven. God only interests
him insofar as God is justice itself.”42 Thus, in saying “I act because I act,”
the “genuine man” means “I, the just person, act thus because justice, with
which I am one, acts through me; and justice—which is my motive—has
no goal outside itself.”
Hence what Eckhart calls the “inner act,” this “conformation” of the
human being to the divine virtues, is not itself an intention. Indeed, I
think it is best identified, as we just saw Flasch do, with a motive (or
set of motives). As Michael Stocker and others have argued, motives—at
least in one important sense of the term—are the ground-from-which we
act, the “out of,” rather than the goal or purpose, the “for the sake of.”43
While only implicit in Eckhart’s texts, this distinction between motive
and intention is the only way I can see to make sense of what Eckhart
says, though it is not discussed by his modern interpreters. Beccarisi, for
instance, writes that “God, in whom the general perfections are united,
42
Kurt Flasch, “zu Predigt 6: Justi vivent in aeternum,” in Lectura II, p. 50, emphasis added. Compare Bruce Milem, The Unspoken Word (Washington D.C.: Catholic
University of America Press, 2002), p. 125.
43
In Stocker’s turn of phrase these two orientations are ‘teleology’ (forwardlooking) and ‘archeology’ (backward-looking). See his “Values and Purposes: the
Limits of Teleology and the Ends of Friendship,” The Journal of Philosophy 78:12
(1981).
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is at work in man to the extent he is good or just, that is, in man in a
non-creaturely sense, who is not guided by external principles, but rather
. . . ‘attends to no why outside himself,’ but acts only through himself.”44
She is right about Eckhart, but what precisely is meant by the phrase she
quotes from Eckhart, to wit, “acts only through himself”? So too with
Kobusch: “This [ground-act of] self-negation, detaching from oneself
and surrendering, is to be thought of as a movement of the will. For this
reason, Eckhart can speak in the same sense of ‘giving up the will.’ It is
not at all that giving up the will makes a person will-less, rather it annihilates only the ‘natural will,’ to use the terminology of Eckhart and Hegel,
that is, the particular will with its drives, desires and inclinations.”45 True
enough, but Kobusch does not specify what “giving up” this “natural
will” which “does not make one will-less” might mean. In medieval
thought, acts (or actualizations) of will can include inclinations, desires,
choices, intentions, enjoyment, etc., to which one can appropriately add
motives (as distinct from intentions). Which is it that Eckhart’s “genuine
man” gives up?
In an important passage for this theme, Kobusch writes: “The object of
every act of will is the good. However, while the creaturely will always
wants only ‘this’ or ‘that,’ that is, wants ‘to have,’ the moral person places
his will in the Good that lies beyond all ways, in the simply and unconditionally Good, or as Eckhart says the ‘Absolute Good,’ the Good in its
truth. This moral good in the sense of general justice cannot be an object of
the will like the many external goods. Rather, as the actually and finally willed,
it determines the essence of the human being. Hence everything that one
does out of willing this absolute good bears the character of the moral.”46
I agree with the first italicized phrase, but not with the suggestion in the
next two sentences, where the terms “willed” and “willing” suggest a final goal or intention, and thus, since every intention supplies a “why,”
would trap Eckhart in a contradiction. Instead, I suggest we see Eckhart
as drawing tacitly on the distinction between motive and intention. His
“general justice” is the new motive, replacing the merchant’s “rewardmotive.” Acting out of it, the new person does all that she does. The Eckhartian agent becomes new in that she now has a different motivation for
everything she does, including those same deeds, e.g., attending to the
needs of her guests or of the poor and sick, which she might formerly have
performed out of a different, and radically inferior, motivation.
If one’s actions (e.g., tending the sick) were not intentional, they could
not express any motive at all. An external goal or intention only makes
one’s action unworthy, according to Eckhart, when it is inconsistent with
the motive of general justice. A spiritual merchant’s failing is not that she
has goals or intentions in her actions: these are unavoidable. Her error is
to perform her good deeds out of an instrumental conception of virtue.
She misunderstands herself and her relationship to God, and hence her
motive is defective. Her will is oriented to a future or further end, based
on the misconception that her eudaimonia lies either in a state outside
A. Beccarisi, in Lectura II, p. 16.
Kobusch, Mystik, p. 54. The Eckhart text referred to is in DW V, pp. 45, l. 12.
46
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herself (Thomas), or in one always still to be achieved through her own
efforts (Aristotle). Such a will we do not need; indeed, Eckhart’s injunction
to live without why means precisely to live without this kind of rewardmotive. For through God’s grace our eudaimonia already lies within us, in
the ground of the soul. What we need is to accept it, through detachment,
an acceptance that is then manifested in virtuous actions.
To the extent the moral virtues are character-traits, they represent a
kind of standing motive: a courageous person is inclined toward certain
sorts of acts, and not others, out of her courage. Motivations are embodied
in intentional actions (as well as in attitudes, emotional responses, et al.),
and the intentions that embody a motive depend on particular circumstances. As Mieth says, “Elisabeth lives from the infused theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. . . . The outcome of these virtues is true inner
poverty, which can coexist with external wealth. But the completion of the
virtues infused into the powers of the soul lies clearly in active love: ‘she
strives to be able, with a pure heart, to wash and care for sick and filthy
human beings.’”47 This “completion” is in concrete action, which of course
embodies the ‘why’ of intentions, though without making the virtuous
action itself a means to some external goal, such as salvation.48
Like Eckhart, Aristotle too thought that virtuous action is, in the sense
explained here, “without a why,” that is, performed for its own sake. In
this respect Eckhart is closer to him than Aquinas is, though Eckhart differs from both in seeing a life of virtue as the expression of our perfection,
and not as either a means to it or the mode of life which constitutes it.
While Eckhart’s ethic is what I call broadly teleological, that is, it aims to
discover, describe, and advocate a process of human development toward
beatitude or happiness, it diverges from Aquinas on the nature and role of
the virtues, and from both Aquinas and Aristotle on the nature and role of
moral action and of life’s goal.
Such a striking break in ethics with teleological conceptions of action
and virtue may be unique in university circles in the middle ages,49 and it
would seem to be deserving of closer attention from contemporary moral
philosophers and theologians. An ethic that puts detachment at its center
should have a serious claim on our interest in this day and age. Why then
has Eckhart’s approach been relatively ignored outside of Germany for so
long? This is likely a long-term effect of the papal condemnation, which
for centuries denied to Eckhart’s works the careful collecting and editing
given to the writings of many of his medieval colleagues. Even Nicholas Cusanus (d. 1464), himself inspired by Eckhart, wrote that “his books
should be removed from public places, for the people are not ready for
what he often intersperses,” even though (Cusanus adds) “the intelligent
47
Mieth, Lectura II, p. 172, emphasis added. The Eckhart citation is from DW 2,
p. 147.
48
The topic of intentions and motives in Eckhart is admittedly complex; I plan
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McGinn (New York: Continuum, 1997).
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find in [these works] many astute and useful things.”50 The ripple effects
of this suppression have, for example, made his works largely unavailable
to English-language scholars until quite recently. Perhaps Eckhart, now
restored to “public places” by the sometimes heroic labors of recent generations of scholars, will again take his rightful place in the philosophical
conversation.51 If so, the debates over virtue-ethics can only benefit.
Smith College
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Nicholas of Cusa, Apologia doctae ignorantiae, vol. 2, ed. Raymond Klibansky,
(Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1932f), pp. 25, lines 7–12. I owe this reference to
Burkhard Mojsisch, “Meister Eckhart,” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
2006, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/meister-eckhart/ .
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